The Progress Congress

A. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. The world capitalist system of today is defined by uncertainties, crisis dynamics, the escalation of the tension between the imperialist centers and the trend for the sharpening of class struggles.
2. The fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the social character of production versus the private ownership of the means of production and the decrease in the rate of profit due to overproduction resulted in the last crisis. In terms of both intensity and the scale, this crisis exposes the magnitude of capitalism's decay. It is seen that the capitalist class does not have the ability to come up with a complete response to the crisis that is still ongoing not only in the economic but political and ideological sense. However, as one of the distinguishing features of this latest capitalist crisis, the weakness of the working class front must also be underlined.
3. The imperialist aggression that intensified during the period of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that continued uninterrupted since then is acquiring a new character as the only response of capitalism to the crisis. International capital makes moves against labor and other actors that stand in its way on the one hand and on the other, it seeks to neutralize the threats to its rule created as a result of these moves.
4. In a conjuncture such as the current one where the radius of action for the capitalist class has shrunk and where it faces new obstacles, the organized struggle of working class has now a higher chance of changing the balance. Near future is ripe for radical changes. For these changes to be of the nature that strengthens the revolutionary front, a revolutionary mobilization of the working class has to get going in at least some fronts.

5. As it has happened in the past, in the current period too, threats against the oppressed peoples, working class and the humanity in general as well as the revolutionary possibilities are felt at the same time. Today, starting with NATO, activities of centers where imperialist aggression is planned and executed have intensified, militarist trends of the European Union has strengthened, the potential for the transition of the internal conflicts of the system into an armed conflict has increased while violations of the sovereign rights of nation states have become more frequent. None of these can be taken into account independent of the capitalist assault on the working class in every country.
6. The main obstacle against the transformation of the period of crisis experienced by the capitalism on the international front into a new period of revolutions is the substantial retreat of the working class in terms of organization as well as socialism in the ideological-political sense when compared to a 100 years ago. The great October Socialist Revolution which we will be celebrating the 100th anniversary in 2017, had become victorious following a couple of decades when the working class made its presence felt as a serious social force coupled with the decay and crisis of imperialism. In this regard, the level of organization of the working class and the increase in the political-ideological impact of socialism  can not be left to its own, to simply depend on the dynamics of the capitalist crisis. At a time when it is facing a crisis in every sense, the transformation of the capitalist dictatorship into a period of socialist revolutions can not happen without the political interventions of the labor front.
7. The relative weakness of the working class results in its reliance on the breathing spaces created by the internal conflicts of the world capitalist system. This trend is the result of turning the defensive position into a permanent one as the pursuit for revolutionary strategies were dropped. The internal fractures and tension of the capital at the international and national scale can in fact acquire a positive meaning only in the presence of an independent revolutionary strategy.
8. In the era that started with the Soviet Union entering a phase of collapse, in terms of the imperialist world, one can talk about an attempt for sustenance not a renewal of the economic, political and ideological hegemony. As it has become more clear in the last decade, the system can not rid itself of crisis in all three areas. The imperialist system with the U.S. at its center can not succeed in reforming itself and reestablishing its hegemony on all dimensions of the international system. Despite this, it is also seen that the internal dynamics of imperialism don't have the ability to create a new alternative either. An inevitable result of this situation is the deepening of the fractures in the imperialist hegemony and the increase in the visible tensions between various blocks. 

9. In this context, it can be said that the hegemony of the U.S. has weakened. That being said, when compared with other imperialist blocks and capitalist centers, the U.S. still continues to be the dominant decisive force in terms of being able to determine the structure of the system and intervention capacity. Weakness in hegemony while being the determinant force at the same time is a sign of the imperialist crisis.

10. The biggest source of friction is the pivot with Russia and China at its center, which also contains internal conflicts that are latent for the moment. The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, which at times are referred to within a system of alliance with countries like Brazil and India, are not in a position to be able to challenge the dominant imperialist hegemony and to create a new imperialist center. This pivot mostly strives on openings that come into existence due to the imperialist crisis. The potential for these two countries to acquire imperialist tendencies and the economic and political consequences for these tendencies come to the fore as a difficult political problematic whose results would be determined by complex dynamics and struggles.

11. As exemplified by the position they held against the imperialist aggression in Syria, the role and character of the Russian Federation within today's world order and the tendencies of the ruling powers of Russian capitalism, have a special significance for the communist movement. The Russian Federation and the international estate it has inherited from the Soviet Union, have been areas of imperialist intervention since the collapse of the USSR. In their quest for destroying all balances of the bipolar world and filling the vacuum with their own hegemony, U.S. and her allies have met pockets of resistance with different sources in almost every country and region and they have not been able to overcome some of this resistance.
12. The Russian Federation, after having entered a lawless phase of capitalist transformation, not only became the strongest point of resistance over time but also attained the ability to act in unison with some of the other points of resistance. In this unique historical situation, it is clear that the Russian Federation objectively plays a positive role when it comes to stopping or slowing down the imperialist aggression. However, it is necessary to question this role with a class and revolutionary perspective. Starting with the working classes in Russia, the Russian Federation positions herself against the labor front as a whole. This class antagonism can not be ignored simply due to various decisions, while in favor of the interests of the exploiter classes of Russia, also happen to oppose imperialist aggression in a particular international problem. In terms of the world revolution, Russia is not a country that could be trivialized and where the class struggle can be suspended for a while.
13. Positions held by countries such as the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, Brazil and India against imperialist aggression have to be assessed one by one with the interests of the world revolution in mind in each case, and the attitude towards these positions need to be shaped by considering the independent and historical interests of the working class. In today's conjuncture, while it is a mistake to classify these countries within the same group as the U.S. and European imperialists and to mask the differences in the capitalist system in the name of having an "equal distance" from all, it is equally a big mistake to hand the faith of the world revolution over to the struggle the ruling classes of these countries wage against the U.S. imperialism in the regional problems they are involved in.

14. The openings filled by the Russia and China centered pivot deepen the imperialist crisis. The aforementioned openings manifest themselves in examples such as the failure of the restoration attempt in the Middle East via the so-called "Arab Spring" or initiatives for alliances to constrain the current imperialist hegemony. In this sense, the problem imperialism faces due to the Russia and China centered pivot is bigger than the sum of the individual powers of these two capitalist forces.

15. U.S.A. uses its policy of showdown with the Russia and China centered pivot also as a means to sustain its sphere of influence in Europe. The intervention in Ukraine is one not only against Russia but also against Europe. Steps taken by the U.S. such as the intervention against the "South Stream" project of Russia within the same time frame of the establishment of a fascist junta in Ukraine, the acceleration of NATO's military pileup by the Russian border make this situation clear. On the other hand, it would be deceiving to claim that the intervention in Ukraine was a "success" for the U.S.A. It is clear that the intervention in Ukraine, a country which historically does not have well defined borders and unity, is designed to force Russia into a defensive reflex. However, Russia's moves in Crimea and southern Ukraine, the support lent by China to these moves and the fact that Germany avoided confronting Russia and China facing these developments, have shown U.S.A.'s limits of the room for political maneuver.

16. The developments in the Middle East in the last three years in the broad dense is another example that exposes both the ongoing influence as well as the limits of the U.S. hegemony. The main purpose of the so-called "Arab Spring" can be expressed as the overthrow of governments by collaborating with the Islamist organizations, starting with the Muslim Brothers, in order to change the balances in the region radically in favor of imperialist interests. This policy has failed.

a. Alliance with the Islamist organizations did not work out. One of the reasons behind this failure is the high level of fluidity between organizations of Muslim Brotherhood type and jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda. Jihadist organizations do not have a general legitimacy, especially in the Middle East region. The pro-enlightenment character of the peoples of the region has prevented a restoration by the U.S. through an alliance of organizations that spanned a wide range including Al-Qaeda.
b. The attempt to establish an alliance among the imperialist proxies failed. Imperialism was able to intervene quickly in the process that started in Tunisia due to its proximity to the European Union but as stronger governments were targeted, friction increased among the countries which imperialism depended as proxies in the region. The most obvious example of this is the split between Saudi Arabia and Turkey/Qatar.
c. The balances that imperialism tried to overturn turned out to be firmer than it looked. The failure of the imperialist intervention in Syria is related to this. The historical and current support of Baath government's strength in Syria aside, it also became clear that the influence of Russia and Iran could not be neutralized in one stroke. On the other hand, one has to take into account the fact that in the so-called "Arab Spring" process, the objective of the U.S. was not to establish a brand new and stable balance in the region but to subject the existing balance to change. Phenomena like U.S.'s change of direction in Egypt by the U.S. after two years, its restraining of Turkey and Qatar in their quest for adventure in Syria and initiation of negotiations with Iran are not simply the results of a clear defeat. The balances have changed a bit even though not as much as expected.
d. The rise of ISIS in the strategic cities in Iraq must also be seen in this context. Irrespective of what deal's product ISIS was or which international force's support was behind its rise, ISIS doesn't signify much more than a relative failure of the U.S. project. Despite this, it is important to keep in mind that the ISIS provides an opportunity for U.S. to renew its projects for the region.

17. The developments in Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East as these regions become focal points of imperialist interventions following the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in big tensions in the internal dynamics of Turkey, creating major challenges for the traditional patterns of behavior for the capitalist class of Turkey. One of the reasons behind AKP's rise to power was because it had been able to formulate a response to these challenges. Despite the region around Turkey is subjected to incessant interventions by the imperialist powers, the interest of the imperialist world has started shifting towards Pacific and Africa. One can expect this development to affect the domestic politics of Turkey over time.

B. FROM REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS TO INTERNAL DYNAMICS: TURKEY

18. The ambivalence and unrest of the U.S. which is fully rooted in the crisis of the imperialist system will inevitably affect actors such as AKP which have to the larger extent relied on the U.S. factor for their political actions. The abrupt sidelining of AKP, which was one of the secondary actors in the regional restoration attempt is related to the nature of the process. An AKP which has not succeeded in falling in step with the maneuvers of U.S. in Syria, Egypt or the Palestinian issue has no chance in playing an active role in Ukraine. AKP attempted to resist the collapse of the Neo-Ottomanism, one of the pillars of the Second Republic but realized the futility of this effort.
19. At what level and how AKP will be able to realign itself facing the new situation is another issue. As an example, opening the borders once is an easy step but closing them back once opened would be a difficult step. Similarly, providing support to jihadist groups is easy, ending the support is difficult. All these are factors that deepen the legitimacy crisis of AKP which has been sidelined as the logic of the Second Republic and neo-Ottomanism relies on an aggressive foreign policy. It is clear that the emergence of a current regional situation which is very different on many fronts and extremely unstable when compared to three years ago will corner AKP from different angles. For example, whether the negotiations between Iran and US result in an agreement or in new tensions will leave AKP in a difficult position due to different reasons. Or as another example, while the oil diplomacy maintained with Barzani provides for AKP a common platform with Washington D.C., on the other hand AKP has problems adapting to U.S. maneuvers with Iran-Iraq, triggering a series of tensions. Renewal of the relations with Israel through the energy deals will certainly increase AKP's room for maneuver within Washington D.C., but it will also be another nail on the coffin of Neo-Ottomanism. The totality of these conflicts point to the fact that external dynamics will continue to be the weak spot for AKP. This in turn is closely related to the realities of the region and the bankruptcy of the Second Republic, not the level of support lent to AKP by the U.S.
20. Neo-Ottomanism went bankrupt. Perceived as a key by AKP for convincing the cautious bourgeoisie of Turkey for more adventurous policies in search of new investment areas and markets, implemented as a foreign policy practice that would provide the necessary energy for the stabilization and consolidation of the Second Republic, designed as a tool to deepen the collaboration with U.S. imperialism even further and to become the main subcontractor of Washington in the region, preferred as the path to establish and strengthen the Sunni axis as the ideological motivation of AKP reactionism, perceived as channel to build stronger political, ideological, military and financial relations with the reactionary Arab powers, designated as a suitable strategy to keep the Kurdish issue under control and to even turn it to an opportunity, planned as a project to facilitate the economic and political integration of Iraqi Kurdistan and regions in Syria with rich oil resources and to accelerate the transition of Turkey into a loose, decentralized structure, accepted as an opportunity to eliminate Iran and Egypt as competitors of the capitalist class of Turkey in the Islamic world and to strengthen the position of Turkey against Israel, the other important U.S. collaborator in the region (Communist Party of Turkey, 2013 Conference Report), Neo-Ottomanism has not only become incompatible with the regional plans of U.S. imperialism but it has also started sabotaging the internal balances that have called forth the Second Republic itself.
21. Imperialist countries and the capitalist class lent support to AKP as AKP moved forward with the determination for implementing bold projects in the domestic and foreign arena which also fed one another. It was inevitable for U.S. and European imperialist to scrutinize the support they lent to AKP rule to the extent the accord between AKP's internal and foreign policies diminished. The pursuit by the imperialist centers to get AKP back in line and to control has also been coupled with their efforts to create an alternative for AKP's rule. So far, in the bourgeois political landscape, no new actor has emerged yet that can reassure the international capital while also establishing stability and backed by the social support and this has worked to AKP's advantage. Despite this vacuum, it is possible for the system to forge a new alternative in the new political landscape after AKP is taken down by a finishing blow at its roots. The main opposition party CHP is blocking this path and providing indirect support to AKP as it is worried that the developments in that scenario could get out of control and challenge the system itself.

Deadlock in the economy
22. It is necessary to consider to what extent the economic structure of Turkey and the conjunctural situation determine the ongoing political crisis and the future role of the dynamics of economy would play in affecting the course the political crisis will take. The Second Republic, having choked right at its establishment stage, has not been able to put forward "a new model for economic growth". It can be stated that instead of such a new model, AKP government reproduced the neo-liberal paradigm in the changing conditions of the country and the region. This reproduction has far reaching results on the economic structure, Turkey's points of integration with the world economy and the composition of the capitalist class. However these emerging results do not signify that AKP has instituted a new "model". The paradigm which relies on high debt levels, influx of hot money, an enormous pressure on the working class, privatization and sale of public resources, rise of the service sector headed by the construction sector and de-industrialization is not one invented by AKP. On behalf of the class it represents, AKP has implemented this paradigm "quite successfully" and is now facing the inevitable end. It is the paradigm itself that came to a deadlock.

23. The expectation that the stagnation of the neoliberal paradigm, after having been given a new lease of life for 12 years by AKP, would transform into an abrupt collapse, triggering new explosions in the political crisis was expressed through out the period from the fall of 2013 to the first months of 2014. Perceptions alluding that the economy of Turkey was walking on the edge and the capitalist class was getting increasingly displeased with the situation and that imperialism could wreck the economic structure carrying AKP's weight in a stroke became popular again. The economic structure shouldering AKP has no future. But this does not mean that a rapid collapse triggered by the financial structure similar to the economic crisis of 2001 is imminent. The stagnation in the long run is perceived by the imperialist centers and some of the farsighted AKP members. With also the help of the international developments,  it is probable that the reactionary government makes it to the end of 2014 without a major accident in the economy. In other words, the atmosphere of crisis that was dominant at the end of 2013 seems to have lightened up for the short term. The course of the political crisis, and the emergence of new moments in the crisis, can completely alter this short term "recovery" perception in the economy. But analyzing the situation in 2014, one should not expect the reverse process, i.e. the political crisis reaching new stages due to a collapse in economy.

24. It is probable for the economy of Turkey to close 2014 with a 3 to 3.5 percent growth, with a minor slow-down compared to last year. However, the stagnation point in the growth in the medium term is approaching. The percentage of the industry, especially the manufacturing industry in the gross national product has dropped continuously in the last 15 years. In this period, the percentage of the manufacturing industry in the GDP has dropped from 24 percent to 15 percent. Such a rapid drop has not been experienced in other capitalist economies similar to Turkey's, with relatively week industrial production infrastructure, except countries like Brazil and South Africa with a large mining industry and mineral exports. Another important development that took place in the last 15 years is the increase of the percentage of construction materials production as a sub-sector within the manufacturing industry. Almost one third of the manufacturing industry production has become dependent directly or indirectly on the construction sector. When one takes into account the fact that new and large scale investments for manufacturing industries are not in the horizon, it becomes clear that there are no prospects for medium term growth. Unlike South Korea and various Asian countries that followed South Korea's path, Turkey has not been able to develop an industrial and technological infrastructure unique to itself. Such a development is not possible in the near future. The process of de-industrialization resulted in changes in the types of employment in the economy of Turkey as well as visible social results.
25. The strengthening of the possibility of AKP to make it to the end of 2014 without any problems on the economic front is to some extent also related to the international dynamics. The international conjuncture has eased the tension experienced by the economy of Turkey towards the end of 2013. The retreat from the loose monetary policies by FED (U.S. Central Bank) had a less severe impact than expected on the economies of countries like Turkey and there was an increase in the inflow of capital to these countries and these two factors had a role in easing up the pressure on the economy in Turkey. The outflow of capital that started in May 2013 had turned into an inflow by February 2014. One of the reasons behind this is FED's acting more "cautious" than expected. Additionally, instigated by fears of deflation, European Central Bank gradually increased its signals for monetary easing. While the European Union has still not announced a policy of monetary easing, one at the same scale as instituted by the U.S. at the end of 2008, the expectations in that direction has risen, especially as the E.U. has pumped large amounts of Euro to the markets at the beginning of June. This indicates that the abundance of dollar that relieved economies like Turkey until recently may be replaced by the abundance of euro. In fact, these dynamics have increased the inflow of hard cash into the so-called "Fragile Five" countries once again. This situation, without a doubt, does not mean that the factors behind the "fragility" have been removed. However, there is also a bullish optimism reflected in the expectations of the international imperialist institutions such as the World Bank. While the global growth forecasts has been lowered, for countries like Turkey, growth forecasts have been increased. The relative decrease in the "political uncertainty" for the local and international capital following March 30th elections is another factor that worked to AKP's advantage on the economy front in 2014.

26. This view brings to mind the question: "Has AKP made all its plans to simply survive 2014?" The developments in Iraq and the rise in European demand not increasing at the expected level are creating risks especially in export and new uncertainties in the short term. It is clear that AKP is utilizing the time that is of great value for it. Even so, the reactionary AKP government has neither the chance nor the ability to use this time for a transition to a new growth model that would breath new life into Turkey's capitalism. As an example, policies that made labor based on "sub-contract" workers as the main form of employment in Turkey, attacks such as the authorization of temporary employment powers to private employment offices, the abolition of severance pay are not tied to the perspective of re-developing a new growth model based on industrial development. Even though AKP has been continuing with an increasing intensity its attacks on the working class, a new accumulation model that will reinvigorate the capitalism of Turkey can not emerge as a result of these attacks. It is also clear that the continuation of the current growth model that relies on the construction sector is directly tied to the continuation of the inflow of resources. Given this, the only choice left for the government is a political quest. The focus of this political quest is the energy sector.
27. The fundamental reason behind the government's focus on energy policies is the aforementioned stagnation. In the quest for turning into an "energy corridor", the addition of two main resources to Azerbaijan, namely Barzani's oil and the Cyprus-Israel gas, the transfer of these resources over Turkey, will enable AKP's re-anchoring with the imperialist centers. Thus, the state of cease-fire with the Kurdish and the inclusion of the Kurds of Turkey using this imperial quest is becoming increasingly important for AKP. However, the collapse of Neo-Ottomanism which was serving as the ideological framework this policy was also rooted in, is an indication that AKP's hand has weakened significantly when compared with the period prior to the political crisis. The fact that not only the government of Iraq but also U.S. strongly opposed to the transfer of Barzani's oil to Turkey indicates that AKP's energy strategy is not one that can put the mind of the Turkish bourgeoisie at ease. That this strategy, which is tied to the conception of the break of Russia's energy monopoly over Europe, has no other alternatives is also not true. In an attempt to break the dependence of West on Russia for energy, U.S. is making both political and technological moves. By increasing levels of shale gas production, from a perspective of self sufficiency, U.S. is moving towards a stronger position in energy export. AKP's focus on energy has no concrete and real prospects. Starting with U.S., imperialist centers will continue directing the steps taken by AKP in the field of energy. They will also continue with their attempts to manipulate not only AKP's energy policies but also Turkey through this policy.
28. A similar trend is also prevalent for the monopolies forming the backbone of TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association). The main sector of bourgeoisie of Turkey is worried about the "long term". This sector is not only disgruntled about the scene of "apportionment" created by AKP's interventions in the field of economy, they are also unhappy as the means to manage the working class in accordance with the level of capitalist development in Turkey has been destroyed. However, for the short term, it is clear that the traditional capital is not challenging AKP in an all-out fashion. From an opposite angle, one should also keep in mind that AKP has developed the tendency to tone down its attacks against the traditional capital.
29. It is clear that the pressure exerted by the economic tools on the working class will increasingly continue and that the support lent by the bourgeoisie of Turkey to AKP will continue to be shaped via this pressure. However, in the following period, at least till the end of 2014, one should not expect a fast and continuous increase in phenomena such as unemployment and inflation. Similarly, non-productive expenditures in the infrastructure and superstructure construction as well as expenditures in the public sector will not stop abruptly. In fact, mega-projects initiated with the elections in mind such as the Third Bridge and Third Airport for Istanbul have been accelerated. As a result, in the short term, one should not expect a confrontation determined heavily by the economic factors between the working class and AKP. This does not mean that action examples similar to TEKEL and Yatağan resistance, a direct result of the neo-liberal paradigm and the fascistic methods implemented by the reactionary government, may not repeat. However, other reasons aside, due to the current conditions as well, one can not deduce the fundamental confrontation between the working class and capital from the generalization of the previous examples.
Bankruptcy of the Second Republic
30. As pointed out in the 2013 conference of TKP, "The reactionary transformation that can be described as the liquidation of the First Republic and the establishment of the second, rocked the dictatorship of the bourgeois to its foundations and let alone solidify it, it made it more fragile." That AKP and in particular Erdoğan as a leader as the main subjects of that reactionary transformation are still at the forefront of the political scene is an indication of the fragility of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie rather than the resistance of the Second Republic. Not only AKP can not devise a solution for that fragility but it is also a potential source for an upcoming deeper crisis.

31. The First Republic in Turkey collapsed in an irremediable fashion. With this collapse which also witnessed a very intense ideological breakdown, the dominant ideology in Turkey was shattered. All the political brands founded on the ideological tendencies associated with the First Republic were impacted by this collapse. All the progressive movements which were based on the limited secularism of the First Republic that was weary of supporting a popular awakening in a working class people's front, all political movements that stood on the Turkish Nationalism as the main ingredient of the nation state of the First Republic, they are all part of this great ideological wreck. This ideological wreck does not have the power to renew itself and to stand on its own feet again, however, it is still capable of neutralizing any political movement that attempts to repeat its ideological themes with the same content and on the same class basis.

32. Having set off with the aim of liquidating the First Republic and establishing a new one, the reactionary movement in Turkey, in addition to being part of the legacy of the First Republic from a class and historic perspective but it is also getting its share of the ideological collapse of it. The religious reactionism in Turkey has always acted in line with the aims and interests of the bourgeoisie of Turkey and having become stronger serving those interests, it became the only alternative for power. Throughout this process, the reactionism of Turkey was supported by the backwards and reactionary elements of the First Republic as well as the anti-communist and anti-labor line followed by imperialism all over the world. The reactionism of Turkey which attempted to realize a grand transformation in Turkey is neither new or independent in the ideological sense.

33. The Second Republic in Turkey is a concrete political response to the quest for power by the most reactionary and dark elements of the bourgeois mentality. For this reason, the Second Republic is obliged to depend on the liquidation all the progressive constituents and ideas of the First Republic. While without a doubt the First Republic relied on the rule of capital, it is a unity that also contains progressive elements, albeit maimed, due to its class nature. As part of that unity, there are sections of the society of Turkey that internalized these progressive elements and the Second Republic was faced with the imperative to exclude in the absolute sense or even liquidate those sectors. Regardless of what the majority of the population thinks or who the ruling power is, such a liquidation is impossible in a country the size of Turkey. 
34. The Second Republic is bound to fail as it is not strong enough in the ideological sense to be able to shoulder a new re-establishment project and as it won't be able to liquidate the progressive and enlightenment elements of Turkey in the most general sense. It has been proven in the recent past that this reactionary project of transformation at the hands of the reactionism of Turkey can not achieve its objectives in the short run and that it has no social legitimacy.

35. The bourgeois republic collapsed in Turkey and the attempt to establish the Second Republic was faced with a deep crisis from the get-go and more importantly it became clear to all sides that it is not possible to establish a new republic within the framework defined by the Turkish political reaction. The ideological and political map of Turkey is stamped with a mood of failure after the collapse and a subsequent state of uncertainty. The bourgeoisie of Turkey and its political and ideological representatives does not yet have a complete plan for an exit out of this state of uncertainty.
36. The ideological crisis experienced by the imperialism world-wide is impedes the ability of the capitalist dictatorship in Turkey to take the ideological and political steps to overcome the state of uncertainty. Imperialism, having gradually lost the ideological hegemony it had gained following the collapse of socialism, is incapable of providing the masses worldwide with any perspective of hope for the future. In the two decades following the September 12 1980 coup, the bourgeoisie of Turkey benefited greatly from the ideological assault of imperialism but as imperialism entered a stage of ideological weakening within the same period when AKP came to power, the Turkish bourgeoisie is now out of breath. The rhetoric claiming to be "democrat, liberal and pro-freedoms" which was utilized heavily during the initial years of AKP's rule is an ideological residual of those two decades. After this rhetoric was consumed, what is remaining is bare-bones religious reaction. The rise of religious reactionism is a problem simply within Turkey. As imperialism failed in replacing what it consumed ideologically, the reactionism that was supported against communism and the working class is now confronting the peoples in various forms. Aside from the countries where left was on the rise, different types of reactionary trends from racism to religious fascism is gaining more and more weight within the bourgeois ideology, couple with a concrete manifestation of these ideologies in the political arena.
37. AKP, as the vanguard and load-bearing force of the Second Republic, faced a legitimacy crisis following the collapse of the project and as the legitimacy mechanisms disintegrated, AKP relied more and more on using the state's various tools of repression. Other than its own reactionary base, having ideologically severed all ties with almost all other sectors of the society of Turkey, AKP has no choice but to use of force towards these sectors. As AKP attempts to defend this use of force and legitimize it in the eyes of its own supporters, the situation becomes increasingly unsustainable. The only way out of this problem is the replacement of force by ideological mechanisms. While imperialism has no real solution to offer AKP in this front, the reactionary liberal coalition that lent support to the Second Republic has no chance of revitalizing itself ideologically to co-opt the sectors ostracized by AKP.
38. The biggest obstacle stopping the legitimacy crisis from deepening further to a crisis of the whole system is the presence of the parties in the parliament as representatives of politics within the system. Once again, opposition within the system is functioning successfully as the 'circuit breaker' for the system. Especially the social democratic opposition in the parliament is extremely important for the sustenance of the image that the system in Turkey is still functional today and in that respect is indispensable for Turkey's capitalism. At this junction, any political actor and project that lends support for sustaining the Second Republic is bound to become reactionary and illegitimate.
39. The failure of the Second Republic is an indicator for the political future of AKP and its leader Erdoğan but it is not the only factor that determines AKP's future. For solutions involving the political liquidation of AKP and Erdoğan or the restructuring of AKP without Erdoğan, it is not sufficient for the capitalist class of Turkey and imperialism to simply agree on a new player, focus or direction. The vacuum that emerged on the Republic axis after the collapse of the first and the crisis facing the second from the get-go, can only be filled with a project of the same scope and size. There is no indication that the bourgeoisie of Turkey and imperialism can develop a project of such scale in the near future.
40. While the developments in Iraq and Syria has transformed the Kurdish issue into one that can not be approached without taking into consideration the regional dynamics, the key to the issue is still the in the hands of the Kurdish of Turkey which constitute the largest as well as most political sector of the Kurdish population of the region. It is given that the Kurdish national movement which has been in negotiations with AKP for a long time is not going to change its current position. The Kurdish movement has not left the negotiating table despite all the reactionary and fascistic step taken by AKP government and all the moves of the Kurdish movement from here on, whether for or against AKP, have to be considered as part of the negotiation process. The relation of the movement with the left and the projects developed with the left are also not independent of this process. While projects developed with the left as part of the attempt to become a movement that reaches out to all of Turkey have become more important from the perspective of the transformation of the Kurdish movement in the "Peace Process" following the transition from BDP to HDP and the control of the legal basis, these projects are not the determining factor in the Kurdish movement. A healthy political relation between the left and the Kurdish movement can be possible only if the left become stronger as a force independent of the Kurdish movement.
41. The shift to the right of the Turkish politics as a whole can not be assessed independently of the legitimacy crisis at hand and the dynamics of that crisis that have the potential to shake the whole system. Not only in Turkey but around the whole world, the bourgeois politics should be investigated on the basis of the positions taken against the left and working class by all the constituents of the bourgeois politic as opposed to analysis that concentrate on the center. In that regard, the bourgeois politics of Turkey is not vacating the center or moving away from it, however it is moving away from the left and it is consolidating its position against the left with the sustenance and the long term priorities of the system in mind. Based on the observation that it will not be possible to establish a new republic on the wreckage of the First Republic and that the capitalist class will not be able to launch a new ideological and political initiative at the same level of completeness and scope of the First Republic, in an environment where the independent working class politics is not strong, one should expect the bourgeois politics as a whole, including social democracy, to solidify its anti-left position and for this position to become permanent.

42. The developments unfolding around the world and in Turkey are widening the basis where the left can intervene and on which it can become prominent, with new fields for struggle. Since the wreckage of the First Republic has no potential to provide a new breath of life to the bourgeois politics and since the Second Republic which was dead on arrival will not be able to help the rule of the capital from an ideological perspective, the social decay, one of the main bases the Second Republic attempted to rise on, will deepen, mechanisms of violence will be deployed, the religious reactionism will intensify instead of slowing down, reactionary and fascistic repression will target all sectors of society in both physical and intellectual sense. The dictatorship of capital has no other choice in order to keep standing. It is not possible to stand against this repression only in the physical sense. The weak spot of the bourgeois rule in Turkey is the ideological plane at the moment. An ideological struggle to be waged against the capitalist class and all its political representatives starting with AKP, will facilitate the fight to be fought in both the physical and intellectual front, it will shrink the basis of the social decay. Any blow to be struck at the system at the ideological plane will increase the determination of the working class for struggle as it causes masses to question the legitimacy of the system.

C. CLASS CONTRADICTIONS, STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM AND OUR TASKS
43. Turkey is a capitalist country with exuberant social dynamics and a fragile economy, where the class contradictions have the tendency to sharpen and the dominant class has to cope with ideological and political crisis. These make Turkey open to a socialist revolution.
44. Struggle for a socialist rule cannot succeed without considering the weak points created by ideological and political crisis of the system. An efficient ideological struggle keeping the Left away from marginality must accompany the political attitude, initiative and action. Capitalist system of Turkey ran out of breath at the very critical point of the great transformation attempted by the AKP government. While the bourgeois politics had difficulties in offering new alternatives, the capitalist rule weakened. The enlightened, pro-freedoms and patriotic background and, of course, our party, played a great role in the development of this weakening. In order not to lose the ground gained, a dominant and constructive intervention by socialist ideology is needed. For a revolutionary strategy, deepening in the society beyond daily political positioning, the socialist ideology must have well-planned and influential attacks on religious, liberal and nationalist ideologies in crisis and on ideologies remnant of the First Republic, which are represented by CHP and which have unique dynamics for crisis. 
45. Our party refused to consider the ideological struggle as the expounding of a simplified version of “scientific socialism”. Unlike the common leftist approach of replacing the terms “theory” and “ideology” for one another, we think that ideologies form in social struggles and with participation of several actors. The field of ideological struggle is the field where the social agents legitimize themselves with reference to certain historical values and structures. This legitimization process is supported by the self-interests and corresponding “values” of the mentioned classes; and by their weight and influence in the society. Ideological struggle for socialism, on the other hand, is a multi-faceted task. This process is realized via the current and historical values of the society and daily political expressions of those values as a whole, including the role of the Marxist theory.
46. The Left in Turkey has the tendency to reduce the actual contradiction with capitalist dictatorship to demonstrations and to have a limited life space in the political and ideological fields. Success of the struggle for socialism is linked to the success of linking the demonstrations and physical contradictions to an ideological and political content. If this does not succeed, the only result will be strengthening of the state ability to absorb the revolutionary energy, which, actually, has a big potential.
Elections and the Left
47. Elections, an important platform for political struggle, have created a similar inefficiency for the Left, too. The idea that socialist movement in Turkey, and TKP, have been unsuccessful in gaining popularity due to their being “inexperienced in state administration” and hence, their performance in elections is flawed. Success in elections cannot be a starting point in the problem of gaining popularity. This handles the problem in an upside-down manner. A communist party which cannot proceed in gaining popularity, which cannot eliminate the pressure of general public opinion, cannot be successful in elections. Elections can be, in general, a means of revolutionary struggle and also, in particular, a means for the socialisation of the Left; but it cannot be deemed as the unique key for these objectives, for both practical and ideological reasons. This reality manifested itself completely after the local elections held on March 30, 2014. These elections were the one with the lowest level of legitimacy during the whole bourgeois democratic history of Turkey. However, one strategy of AKP, which is eliminating or relieving the legitimacy crisis of the Second Republic using the elections, is still in use and it requires creating a detailed political line against this strategy. Legitimacy of the Second Republic, with all its institutions, must be questioned in the elections. In addition, it is essential to prevent AKP from using the trump of the success in elections and gaining the majority. The discrepancy between these two tasks can be solved according to the objective conditions and also to the subjective needs of the Party. 
48. Success in elections in some localities, like the one in Hatay-Defne, can be meaningful not as a result of a special strategy in elections, but as a result of a strategy for struggle and organizing people over a long period of time. Our Party, must act according to its political and organisational priorities, rather than developing a categorical and single attitude. Regarding its practical choices in elections up to now, Party approached to the society for organising in both vertical and horizontal directions; evaluated elections as a process for increasing its internal organization; attached importance to this practice in terms of widening means for social propaganda and and as a platform that reveals the power of masses that detach themselves from the system.

The June Uprising and the revolutionary strategy
49. The Uprising in June 2013 was the most important popular revolt of Turkish history. It revealed a very important set of data for a revolutionary strategy and created a real basis for the struggle for socialism. Although the struggle cannot be defined with a demand for systemic change, it incorporated most of the social agents of a possible revolutionary leap in Turkey. While the weight  of the workers in the millions that rose up was   evident, ideologically or politically, the class character of the burst of anger against AKP should not be underestimated. The June Uprising brought together a very diverse mass of workers in an enlightened and pro-freedom line of struggle and made it possible to cross a critical line in the struggle for socialism.
50. The assessments about the June Uprising made by TKP in the document “September Theses for the June Uprising” in September 2013 are still valid. The struggle dictates our party to refine the political direction and employ new tools in political-ideological struggle, rather than make essential changes in the political direction. The party fell short of its tasks when it hesitated to politically organize the energy of the June Uprising. The expectation that the June Uprising would become permanent and create social organisations resulted in the inefficiency of the political intervention, which was strictly needed by the struggle based on a dialectical relation of organisation and movement.

A more urbanised and educated working class
51. The working class of Turkey has undergone a rapid change and the result is a more educated and urbanised mass of labourers. The material background of this change is determined by the speed of urbanization, differentiation of sector structures, demographical developments, increase in the average length of education etc.; whereas ideological, cultural and political processes were also influential in this process. Between 2005 and 2014, the labour force in Turkey increased from 20 million to 25 millions of people. In the same period, the share of agricultural sector in total employment decreased from 25% to 20%, the share of industrial sector remained nearly the same and the share of services sector including construction increased from 53% to 58.5%. In those 10 years, the number of people employed in the services sector increased from 10 million to 15 million.
52. The urbanization process, which has been continuing since 1950s together with domestic migration, became more rapid in 2000s. The urbanization in Turkey is characterized by industrialization and labourisation in 1960s, by domestic migration due to export-oriented industrialization model and the resulting demand for cheap labour in 1980s and by Kurdish migration in 1990s. In 2000s, a new and unique period has begun due to construction-oriented economic growth, financial expansion, diversification of services sector etc. and the result was a decade of rapid urbanization. The portion of urban population in total population of Turkey was 31.5% in 1960, 44% in 1980, 59% in 1990, 62% in 2000 and more than 75% in 2012.Today, in addition to the facts that 3 out of 4 people in Turkey live in the urban areas and that they are employed in non-agricultural works, the increase in capital concentration in service sector, especially in trade, resulted in increased proletarianization of educated people. Economic crisis of 2001 and the following structural transformation for the benefit of capital accelerated this process.
53. Some part of service sectors existed as a result of fragmentation of the production process due to increased role of sub-contracting and other reasons. Logistics, sales and marketing, private security, research activities, which were parts of industrial production, were separated from the production process rapidly in 1990s and 2000s. However, reasons for the growth in service sectors are preference for a growth model based on non-industrial sectors, particularly the construction sector; new fields created by technological developments; and rapid increase in consumption in parallel to the rapid increased in urban population. With the increased variety in loan opportunities, consumption habits changed. The most prominent indicator of the change in the structure of proletariat is the increase in the number of educated workers in rapidly developing service sectors. The second indicator is the considerable increase in the labour participation rate of women in service sectors of urban areas, despite the liquidation of agricultural sector, which was abandoned by female workers, and despite the reactionary practices of AKP government.
54. In addition to the ideological processes, the difficulty for urban workers in imposing their qualitative and quantitative significance in daily lives, especially in Istanbul and Ankara can be deemed as a negative aspect. One reason for this is the urban structure created by AKP government. However, this dynamic of urban workers has the opportunity of having a significance much ahead of its physical existence, using creative forms of action and organisation in the struggle.
55. Unorganized state of the worker class in Turkey is one of the most serious obstacles against the popularisation of the struggle for socialism in Turkey. The fragmented structure of the workers’ class along qualitative and quantitative lines deepens this problem and makes it impossible to be successful in unique efforts for organizing different categories of the class. An attempt to change the unorganised state of the class can be successful only when it includes a political struggle, which corresponds to the needs of working people for being organized and which has a definite aim and an ultimate end. 
56. The change in the structure of the workers’ class in Turkey created the necessary conditions for easing the politization of workers and for supplying them with various social channels that they can express themselves without pulling back their class identities. The fact that some portions of the workers’ class, especially the workers of services sector, were prominent in the June Uprising, was the result of the same conditions. Also, it was seen in June that industrial workers participated in the demonstrations in some localities and they came together with the other portions of the class; so, a common channel for struggle was opened. Unity and organisation of the working class is possible if a politicizing and systematic approached is used and when workers express themselves in direct social channels, rather than using different models of organizing based on the inter-class differences or coercive models for uniting these differences under the same roof. For this reason, approaches based on workplaces and sectors should not be dividing and narrowly focused on economic struggle. Attempts to organize the working class as workers, temporary workers, unemployed workers, retirees, contracted and subcontracted workers, permanent workers; white- and blue-collar workers; unionized workers, nonunionized workers, unregistered workers; industrial workers, agricultural workers, service sector workers; public workers etc. must be shaped with these concerns.   
57. Isolation of the working class of Turkey from other social fractions with the need for horizantal organizing as its justification  is a big mistake. Politization and organization of the workers’ class in Turkey will be achieved by permanent organizations in workplaces and social channels for workers.
58. Unions in Turkey have lost their function as a means for ending the unorganized state of the workers’ class. The unionization rate is 9.45% and the number of unionized workers is around 1 million. However, these official statistics include the on-paper membership and so, it is estimated that the real rate of unionization is around 5%. The unionization rate will decrease further if the definition of the workers’ class is expanded and the huge masses of working people are added in these numbers. This picture shows that unions no longer have an ability and capacity for organizing the class, reaching to workers and being a means of propaganda. This is related to the lack of confidence on unions by workers and he society as a whole, as seen after the disaster in Soma mines.
59. The organization efforts started by TKP under the name of “not farm, class union” several years ago was based on the given situation of trade unions in Turkey. These efforts slowed down as the party grew up for the sake of short-term and temporary organizational gains, in order to exploit the opportunities in the trade-unions. Similar concerns led to unwieldiness in the organizational practices within the class and created fruitless and passive expectations in trade union practices which lost efficiency. It is obvious that in Turkey, trade-unions do not create a suitable environment for organizing the working class and, on the contrary, they constitute an obstacle against the efforts for reaching the class. This is also valid for the trade unions of state workers. New approaches to trade unions which aim to have healthier and more result-oriented practices in order to alter the existing trade union centres and to organize the working class become useless and fruitless due to the efforts to protect internal balances of trade unions. For this reason, any political approach to the trade unions should be planned as a radical start, which appeals to all sectors and all workers and which gets rid of any kinds of effort to protect the existing balances in the trade unions. It is obvious that this start would reject the existing approach and basis of the trade union movement. In order to realize such a radical start, the organization practice within the workers’ class must go beyond a coordination of trade-unions. The energy to vitalize the trade unions in Turkey will be created by organizing the workers’ class in social and political movements.

Quest of the youth and socialism 
60. The claim for founding a new regime must create a dynamic of youth representing the “new”. An important indicator that the Second republic cannot be founded is that it cannot create such a dynamic of youth. The effectiveness of religious reactionism among the youth is primarily based on the sentiments like dependency on power, selfishness and protecting oneself against the concerns of future. The fact that AKP could not respond to the dynamics of youth during the June Uprising and the attempts to respond to these dynamics could not go beyond being ugly and cowed indicates that reactionism will not be able to create a different youth dynamics which will legitimize a social project and carry it onward.
61. Hostility of reactionism against science and enlightenment transform the academic institutions into “vocational courses” and made them obsolete scientifically, culturally and intellectually. The whole system of education rejects the progressive and enlightened gains of the humanity along with pro-freedom and egalitarian values. What reactionism promises to young students is unemployment, negative working conditions which are as bad as unemployment, a permanent concern for the future and hopelessness, in addition to the cultural infertility.
62. What makes the June Uprising important is that the youth has carried its partial angers and reactions to a social quest, which questioned the legitimacy of the existing system. The majority of youth is seeking for a more egalitarian, free and enlightened society. This search is reconciled with the socialist ideology. The opportunities for the socialist ideology to address and organize the youth have increased in a rapid way, something that hasn't happened in years. As the process included the collapse of the First Republic, the June Uprising witnessed that the political reflexes related to the First Republic became inefficient among the youth. It became impossible that AKP reactionism would substitute the First Republic with a more reactionary, oppressive and unfair regime and persuade the youth to this attempt. As seen during June, youth is one of the social categories among which the distance between secular, pro-freedom, solidarist and anti-imperialist sensitivities and socialism is covered rapidly.  In this context, youth is one of the main social carriers of an egalitarian, secular, pro-freedom and anti-imperialist approach, which can realize its real meaning with socialism.
63. The youth is not revolutionary categorically, by itself. If there is a revolutionary tendency, main reason of this is that the youth is the social category where the answers for the future are responded rapidly because of the intensity of expectation and worries in young ages. The Party will direct these expectations of the youth to a more complete structure and carry these to a struggle for a new society, basically focusing on ideological struggle. Party will not let these expectations be drained and hurt by the channels where the existing system is legitimized. In this context, strengthening the ideological struggle is not only an opportunity, but also a political need and obligation. Oppressive reactions against everything from the freedom of sexuality to the freedom of speech; glorification of mediocrity and ignorance against intellectual, scientific and artistic richness; imposition of a consumption-oriented and boring culture of life aimed to save the day and imprisonment of any kind of reactions to this situation in the individual areas of life, are the inseparable parts of the projects of reactionist movements to destroy progressive and creative social dynamics. Our party will create the necessary tools that the cultural reaction of the youth needs for gaining an ideological and political depth and completeness against reactionism; both in schools and on the streets. Party will not let the struggle for liberating the society to step back.
64. Turkey is a country with a young working class. So, the changes in the composition of the working class have also affected the youth. When compared with the previous decade, it is possible to say that the young workers are more urbanized, more educated and that they are employed in the service sector in a bigger proportion. On the other hand, “worker students” as a part of the youth and the working class, are remarkable due to the types of exploitation they face. In this era, exploitation of labour of students is more common. Mechanisms for this exploitation are diversified and more spread. This labour exploitation went beyond the seasonal forms, including training and internship. The demands of “worker students”, who have to work under slavery conditions to gain the money for education and who are exploited under the name of training, project tasks, applied courses etc., for humanely wages, humanely conditions of work, secured jobs and trade union rights must be a subsistent part of the revolutionary activity of the Party within the youth. Party should play a pioneer role in these aspects. Party must invent tools for bringing the struggles of the youth and the more traditional parts of the working class together.
65. The enlightened and progressive cultural wealth and historical values of the humanity and of our country are under the destructive and repressive attacks of AKP in parallel with its reactionary and pro-market policies. Social support for the AKP project is linked to the creation of citizens who are alienated from scientific questioning, who are astounded and burst into superstitious thinking and to the transformation of these citizens into subjects. This is a type of destruction whose negative effects on the dissolving and declining relations among people can not be ignored. Any antidote of reactionism and pro-market ideology is the target of AKP reactionism. Party will stand by progressive, revolutionary and free artistic creations, cultural practices, scientific researches which are under the attack of religious reactionism and pro-market reactionism, will equip all its cadres with such a consciousness and will meet with intellectuals, who are essential parts of the struggle for socialism, on a basis of the class struggle in the area of culture and arts; against this cultural destruction, historical barbarism, glorification of cheapness and exclusion of quality by AKP politics. 
 
Progressive parts of Kurdish people
66. It is obvious that an important portion of urbanized labour classes include the Kurdish population. Our Party, as in the June Uprising, has the responsibility to organize the Kurdish workers who are involved in the rising social struggles due to their sense of social consciousness, rather than the sense of belonging to an organization. The interest for complicated and often unsolvable strategic subjects caused by regional and even international dimension of Kurdish problem will continue to exist. At the same time, it is obvious that solidarity with the Kurdish people continues to be a responsibility, which cannot be ignored. However these subjects should not surpass the main responsibility.
67. The most progressive portions of Kurdish people in terms of class consciousness live in the Western part of Turkey and in big cities of the Eastern region;and they experience both deep class contradictions and ideological conflicts. A small but significant portion of urbanized Kurdish workers and intellectuals are  in our Party. Expansion of this portion depends on the enrichment of political and cultural means related to this portion of society. It is obvious that such steps will be effective on Kurdish people living in Kurdish cities and Europe, and over time, on Kurdish politics.
68. The approach of Kurdish national movement to class struggles, the fact of religionization and important ideological and political tensions which occur in Turkey and in the region lost its ability to reach  an expanding portion of Kurdish population although it alters in time according to tactical manoeuvres. Our Party must pay more attention to the political and ideological search of people in this portion of Kurdish population than the attention it pays to the daily positioning of Kurdish politics. This part of population has a considerable impact on the working class and student youth in Turkey.
Alevi Dynamism and the Left
69. AKP based its expansion policies regarding Alevi population on three reasons: to create a basis of legitimization in the conflict against the First Republic; to gain the time it needs to liquidate the old regime and to open some breaches in Alevi population in order to assimilate this mass  to fortify  an Islamist-Sunni line. The mission determined by AKP for Alevi population is the  abandonment of their religious and cultural claims and becoming of an authentic sub-culture of Sunni Islam. It is quite clear that this command in the form of a demand does not fly with  the Alevi masses. As underlined in one of the documents of 11th Congress, titled “Religionization and Communists”, the Second Republic has its limits and Alevis still exist as one of the elements of these limits. 
70. The ideological siege by reactionist AKP on Alevis creates a potential danger of liberal and identity politics to be accepted by Alevis on a “sectarian perspective”. However, it was clearly seen during the June Uprising that the secular and republican persistency is still the priority of Alevi movement and that the Alevi masses remain distant from sectarian and identity-based demands. Yet, the demand for equal citizenship, which is adopted by the majority of Alevi masses accepting progressive and enlightenment values, reached  its limits. It must also be considered that Alevi community lives mostly in city centres and has a more urbanized character compared to the past. The meeting point of reaction and struggle against AKP rule with the social quest is also the basis where the Left will meet with Alevi masses.

Politics in Turkey and Women
71. When the emergence, development and contemporary conditions of capitalism are considered, it must be kept in mind that male-dominant social structure, which goes beyond capitalism historically, is one of the main constructive and re-constructive factors of social relations within capitalism and it is re-formed permanently with these relations. Gender inequality was and still is one of the main social patterns which gave shape to the social structure of the capitalist system and which are also formed by this very social structure. Since 19th century, progressive social struggles gained several positions against gender inequality. However, due to the weakening of the working class as a historical actor and imposition of a new social role for women by neoliberal-conservative politics, these gains were either lost or ineffective. In parallel with these objective developments, it is seen that ideological centres of struggle against gender inequality throughout the world declined and failed to win new battles due to several reasons. These reasons included rejecting the role that social relations of production have in reproduction of gender inequality; focusing on solutions within the capitalist system exclusively; preferring to comply rather than struggle with conservative and/or religiously reactionist ideologies which became dominant in the political area rapidly after the end of the Cold War. 
72. Women did not accept to be imprisoned in the roles shaped for them by AKP rule and they participated in the June Uprising in a broad and active way; which indicates that women are one of the most important obstacles against the social construct of the reactionary government. It is an unsolvable tension that AKP cannot give up trying to reshape the social relations and daily life in accordance with the religious-reactionist ideology and on the other hand, women consider reacting against this process as a “right to life”. In Turkey, a communist movement have to consider the increasingly serious concerns of women and to give radical answers to the problems of women, or it cannot be successful.
73. Leading role of women during the June Uprising strengthened the hand of socialist movement against the liberal women’s movement. Women who resisted during the June Uprising condemned the support to religious reactionism by liberal approaches, which undermine the women problem as a problem of identity and underrate and even reject the gains of women related to modernization and secularization in Turkey. The dynamic of women which emerged during the June Uprising gave the opportunity to socialist movement to express itself and have a leading role in the struggle for “freedom”, which has been discussed on a liberal basis for a long time. The “libertarian” approaches, which had a relationship with religious reactionism especially during the destruction of the First Republic, lost their power with the demand for freedom of women against religionization of the society. This closed the gap between the desire of freedom and the struggle for enlightenment. The socialist movement now has a historical opportunity to be more courageous in the area of “freedom”, where an ideological struggle with liberalism still goes on.
74. Women living in cities in Turkey, including in the first place white-collar female workers and female high school and university students who do not have a future other than being exploited by the system, are the leading the struggle of women against religionization of the society. White-collar female workers have a priority among those women as they are urbanized labourers. White-collar female workers is a group of people, who have the capacity to determine ideologically the debates on the women problem in Turkey and who have the potential to struggle fiercely, as seen during the June Uprising. A part of these women have their roles in the work life and the rest continue their education at high-school and university level and prepare to participate in the qualified labour force of Turkey. Together, they constitute a population that will impact the Turkish politics in the near future.
75. When the struggle of women is considered, the role of women peasants who defend the nature and their lives against the expoliation by capital and the role of women who work at their homes and react to AKP politics cannot be underestimated. Opposition by these women, although not always directly related to the “women problem”, is important because it increases the social legitimacy and extensity of resistance against AKP and it determines the social psychology.
76. AKP rule and religionization does not only mean directly to be forced to have children, forced to be dependent on males in polygynous marriages, to be deprived of productivity in social life and participation in working life, to be forced to economic dependency and a life confined to a house. It is needed in neoliberal and reactionist context that women should be slaved in workshops, factories and offices. Religious reactionism of AKP includes some risky tendencies in terms of these necessities of capitalist system, but it also responds to these needs. Religionization is also a means and a prerequisite for women participation in educational and professional life in some cases. Religious reactionism is trying to be dominant on women not only in ideological area, but also in economic sense.
77. 12 years of AKP rule became a factor which reinforced the male dominance in Turkey. Increasing number of femicides is the clear proof of this situation. For this reason, our Party will wage a bitter struggle against gender inequality and  religionization, which deepens this inequality. The Party will struggle against all problems  women face, including the attacks on the  abortion rights, sexual harassment, child marriage and violence against women, all of which are violations of  human dignity. 

LGBT, the June Uprising  and Socialism
78. LGBT people, who struggle for a honourable life, increased the legitimacy of their struggle during the June Uprising as one of the leading social fractions of the struggle. They have strengthened the solidarist and egalitarian ideological elements of the struggle. The demand for “equal citizenship”, which is an important part of the struggle by LGBT people, is standing against the Second Republic, above all, due to the practices of the Second Republic which undermine the citizenship law. Under the religious reactionism supported by AKP government, the right of life, rather than the demand for “equality”, is under question. The LGBT struggle, which was imprisoned in a liberal context before the June Uprising, gives the signs that it will leave this context, under the new political and ideological environment created by AKP government. Party will create new channels to meet this dynamic with growing importance, in metropolis cities in the first place but also in the whole country, with the struggle for socialism.

The June Uprising and the Effort for Organizing the Party
79. The search for organizing is a dynamic that came out with the June Uprising and it is of great importance. This search is a direct result of enlightened, secular, patriotic, anti-imperialist and in several ways, anti-market and anti-capitalist sentiments. The common base of these sentiments is the need for organizing against AKP. In the period of the June Struggle, liberal and nationalist tendencies that targeted these sentiments, individually or as a whole, made this need for organizing more urgent. Those who supported the idea of being unorganized and those who stressed the individual characteristics of people rather than the common aims and principles which gave way to the struggle were not a few people. People who defend the idea that the legitimization of the movement is related to the protection and even enhancement of this “diversity” are those who propagandize for  being unorganization. However, the diversity of the masses in June movement is not a characteristic to be “protected”; but it is rather a situation due to the common target and the social sentiments that the movement is based on. The main mission is organizing these sentiments and making them resistant to the demoralizing and intimidating interferences. This will be possible if a new popular movement  is created, which is based on these principles and sentiments but also goes beyond these and opens new fields for other sentiments and if the unorganized movement is carried to the level of politics.
This does not mean that the masses who feel that the continuity of struggle is linked to the creation of an organized mass movement with a determined political aim are homogenous and that they entirely move for a systemic change. Among the masses which the search for organizing is answered, there are those who say “AKP should go” and who are aware of the fact that CHP, which declared loyalty  the Second Republic, delays the fall of AKP by exhausting the resources of the June Uprising. Among the masses which respond to the need for organizing, there are, of course, those who see the necessity of a systemic change. Party must respond to this yearning.
D. PARTY ORGANIZATION WHILE GETTING PREPARED FOR REVOLUTIONARY DUTIES

80. Communist Party of Turkey could not succeed in managing the tension between the goals of becoming socialized, leading the social dynamics and localization, and the necessity of securing the organizational foundations. The objective conditions certainly played a role in this failure. But, at this point it is necessary to confront boldly the voids in party life and managerial mistakes. Our party is not able to grow sufficiently but yet experience some “growth diseases”. These problems must be overcome. 
81. The radical arrangements aiming to break the introversion, hierarchism, and lack of politics inside the Party did not work because central problems at the heart of the problem could not be overcome. On the other hand, those arrangements ended up weakening the organizational structure of the party. The steps such as changes in the unit structures, opening the unit meetings to outside and forming Organization Council did not lead a revival of the organization.
82. Organizational health of the communist parties depends on the impact of the center of the party on the political production, getting feedback from the entire party during this production, fast and equal internalization of decisions by the party, reproduction of the decisions while preserving their essence in all working fields of the party, reaching a structure to powerfully put these decisions to practice, establishing a continuous and dynamic education structure, and keeping the communication channels open inside the party. There can’t be an ideal and permanent model to realize all of these. Party has to renew itself according to the needs of class struggle to preserve these qualities.
83. In this context, the balance between institutional structure of the party and the change in organizational structure and mechanisms in response to conditions and new needs should be established well. It is not a cause but an outcome that organizational structure of our party became a jigsaw puzzle. Our party paid for not being able to overcome for a long time an apolitical administration mentality that contradicts with our revolutionary duties. This mentality cannot be seen as an individual problem of some of our comrades. However, not being able to break up the resistance of this mentality is a result of the problem of a lack of cadres that affects our central committees as well. TKP could not create sources or activate the existing sources that will enrich political and organizational structure of the party and counteract the status quoist tendencies, which were disabling party life. This is the main problem behind the current crisis in the Party. 
84. The consequences of trying to energize the Party by changing the organizational structure without curing the source of problem were that party members became more alienated, got tired and did not take seriously the arrangements brought up with good intentions. However, it was necessary to suppress, from top to bottom, a certain management type that devitalized the party without personalizing and avoiding seeking balance. The Party could not create the necessary energy to do this. As a result:
a) Party’s meticulousness about theoretical production and the unity between political wisdom and organizational skills began to deteriorate;
b) A managerial layer emerged in the Party and responsibilities started to be distributed in this layer;
c) The cadres outside of this managerial layer stepped aside the party life and even went out of it;
d) Gradually less people started to contribute to production of central politics in the Party;
e) A managerial typology emerged who speaks for the Party center but uses party decisions and production to protect their own positions;
f) This managerial style degenerated the Party sometimes with instructions and orders and some other times by playing ball, feeling an empathy with members when they raised objections.
g) The latency in organizing the party politics is abused as a dichotomy between party and organization;
h) As we have seen in the recent crisis, although they have been taking the primary responsibilities and holding the key positions in the Party for years, this managerial layer, seeing their positions threatened, withdrew and tried to turn party organization against the party center. 
85. It is absurd to blame this managerial layer for our party’s organizational problems. The question needs to be answered is how this managerial layer emerged. This managerial layer is a product of underestimating the importance of reproducing the foundational values of the Party due to the pressure of daily needs and urgency of the political objectives. 
86. From now on, no matter what happens, a managerial layer should not be allowed to emerge in our party. In the struggle for socialism, duties can be assigned, responsibilities can be taken but there can’t be a permanent position for management. Management should be trivialized while taking duties and responsibilities are encouraged. Therefore, duties and responsibilities should be defined very well. The objectives of duties and responsibilities should be determined and their time periods should be defined. 
87. Party must be absolutely institutionalized. However, institutionalization cannot be provided with blueprints that ignore the needs of the struggle for socialism, a static organizational structure, and officialism. Institutionalization can be possible with making the rules and standards that will secure party’s revolutionism, impact and unity, long lasting in party life. 
88. Party members’ ability to establish a healthy relationship with party program, culture and politics, and to secure their development as a communist is the first condition of institutionalization. Intra-party education should be realized in all stages and fields of party without being perceived as knowledge transmission in a narrow sense. 

89. Party membership means becoming politically organized besides taking sides. Creating the ground that will hold the members organized and make them feel organized is another condition of institutionalization. The alternative of stagnant, aimless and nonoperating units cannot be leaving those units alone. Party must be reorganized from top to bottom and not leave any single member out of the organization. 

90. Although it has been agreed on many times, the facts that periodical assessments of central activities, field works and individual units could not be conducted or conducted ones did not reflect the realities most of the time, and that the success-failure criteria could not be defined are other problems created by a mediocre management type that never took responsibilities for the failures. A managerial layer declaring their impunity and indispensability is created in the party. The ground for any healthy discussion has disappeared. The party has been surrendered by a working style that administration comes to the fore in place of political leadership. It is impossible for accountability and criticism mechanisms to work in such as structure where management becomes so important. It is clear that individual attempts fail to overcome this kind of bottlenecks but makes the problem insolvable. 
91. Raising the new cadres in party cannot be boiled down to education topic. Communist Party (KP) must have an honest and constructive communication with its members that will make them more equipped and confident. It should guide its members without impositions and blunting their individuality but by contributing to their future planning as comrades. It must be ensured that party committees and people taking responsibilities in these committees have the required maturity and intellectual equipment. 
92. Raising the standards in the party also depends on the intra-party life and development of the membership culture. Party should develop resistance against every kind of ideological attacks of the system and create a counterweight. The facts that discussion was replaced by gossiping; spirit of comradeship based on a collective consciousness was replaced with a type of friendship with a weak humanitarian basis; and comradely chat was replaced with lobbying show that party deteriorated in the ideological struggle. Worse than that, our party, despite its advanced political position, unfortunately became a party where backward and sloppy ideas are randomly manifested. The membership culture adds another dimension to the problem of party standards. Party should be cleared of irregularity, lawlessness, ignorance and irresponsibility. 
93. The emphasis on “urbanity” in the recent intra-party debates, underrated by some in an unhealthy way is very important in terms of revival of party life. It is a tragic situation in itself that a mentality that sees urbanity as “emulation of petty bourgeois” emerged in the party. The June Resistance is the proof that socialist revolution in Turkey will arise from an urban commonality. When we intervene in social dynamics, we cannot formulate the problem as only party leading the masses outside. Party has to be able to appeal to urban workers, to come into contact with them, encompass them, and develop the appropriate organizational culture to eventually lead them. Unfortunately, our party is away from this. While developing such an organizational culture, KP will also certainly make a move that will clean the party from the patriarchal attitude and a sexist political language.

94. A party that loses its claim and ability to transform and develop its members would decay. As a working class party, KP never allows mediocrity, shallowness, ignorance and laziness being inured in the party while it also faces with elitist tendencies and condemns an understanding that sees party membership as a privilege for only talented or educated people. 
95. Communist Party cannot allow young communists’ party identities being eroded while it is targeting to create a new youth movement and bringing working classes and students together in mass organizations.

E. AN ORGANIZATIONAL SHAKEUP AND EFFECTIVE POLITICS

96. Communist Party should be reorganized on the basis of units with well-defined objectives and working fields in a way that will not leave any single member out of the political struggle. Units in each organization should be formed in connection with concrete political objectives of the party, taking into each member’s opinions and suggestions.
97. All organizations and bureaus of the party should determine their objectives in line with the Congress decisions; they should assess their success in terms of their goals with periodical intervals at every stage of the party; and they should share these assessments with the Party.

 

98. Party conferences should be prevented to steal role from congresses and in every three years, comprehensive congresses should be organized where all cadres from bottom to top are determined with elections.

99. Our understanding of collective leadership should be explained to both the party and the public and this advanced understanding of politics should be propagated for. Creation of a leader cult should not be allowed and all ranks of the party should be adapted to a collective understanding of the leadership. 
100. The Central Committee should be defined as the collective leadership of the party and kept at a size, which will ensure that it is an effective, congruent, productive, and dynamic board. The division of the labor and commissions and committees to be established inside the Central Committee should not damage the collective character of the Committee and shouldn’t take over its powers. 

101. Central Committee membership should not be based on representation of a field or organization under any circumstances; it should be based on the ability of being part of and contributing to the collective leadership. What determines central committees and cadres of the party is a comprehensive and in-depth political understanding that sets goals, organizes and mobilizes in line with the needs of socialism struggle.

102. Disciplinary and supervisory committees with well-defined powers should be established in the party. These committees should not hesitate to use their power to secure the standards of the party life.
103. The priority in Party’s reorganization should be given to the establishment of a professionally organized Party School that is suitable for party traditions and addressing all levels of the Party. All members should be put in a multidimensional education process. 

104. The internal publication of the party should be restructured in a way that it will develop the common wisdom of the party, encourage and organize the internal debates and production, strengthen the membership culture, contribute to in-party education, and open a real and honest information channel about party. 

105. Professionalism in the party should be allowed with central committee decision and for one-year periods. It should not be allowed that members became financially dependent on the party. The expectations from professionals and their working conditions should be defined. 

106. Organizational Council that was designed with the aim of strengthening the backbone of party as party memberships increased but actually did not serve the purpose and stole role from the Committees, should be abolished.
107. It should be prevented that central committee members ignore their duty of ensuring party’s political and organizational unity while they share the work in different fields among themselves. 
108. All measures should be taken for membership meetings to take place, without disruptions or delays, in an advanced way suitable for our party both in terms of content and shape. 
109. A theoretical, political and organizational transformation plan that will enable our female comrades to take more responsibility in the party should be initiated by the Central Committee right after the Congress.
110. A new Party Constitution should be prepared as soon as possible in line with the decisions that will be taken in the Congress of Breakthrough (Leap) and the constitution should be introduced to the party life after discussions in the Constitution Congress. The “Introduction” part of the party program should be renewed in the same Congress.